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Abstract
This paper analyzes the auditor independence issues debated during the Accounting
Wars, and their applicability to present and future impacts stemming from the Enron
fallout. This study documents SEC proposed independence changes and the resulting
conflicts between Big Five accounting firms and the SEe. Past and current proposals are
examined separately. Relationships or similarities are noted. Based on the progression of
past and present proposals and mandates, a determination of future changes is made.
A strong relationship exists between the past and present proposals which indicates
substantial changes within financial reporting, the elimination of consulting services, and
the creation of new oversight boards. The cause and effect of each proposed change is
discussed. From this analysis, accounting firms with SEC registrant clients can generate
a realistic picture of the future of accounting.
Independence Impaired: An Analysis of Proposed Changes in Assurance Services and the
Future Impact on the Accounting Profession
The late 1990's saw a heated debate between the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Certified Public Accountants referred to as the Accounting Wars. Led by Chairman Arthur
Levitt, the SEC expressed concerns over a variety of issues said to impair independence. After a
highly publicized feud, each side made concessions. The result was the SEC's adoption of
revised independence rules and the contraction of several consulting services.
The Enron debacle has once again thrust accounting issues into the spotlight. The press coverage
and public interest associated with the fallout has been unprecedented. Accountants are
expecting sweeping changes, but unlike the Accounting Wars, the profession cannot defend
itself. The Enron audit failure destroyed accountants' credibility.
Enron has brought about a seemingly endless list of proposals and suggestions for changes to the
accounting profession. Thus, speculating on every change is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, by examining the proposed and enacted changes of the past, it is possible to anticipate
changes in the future.
Back1!TOUnd
In the early eighties, consulting practices began to grow, but the impact on the overall earnings
was not substantial. Nevertheless, Congress looked at the consulting services for audit clients
and found no improprieties. This was the second time audit-consulting relationships had been
examined. A decade earlier, Congress performed a similar evaluation and reached the same
conclusions. That was before consulting became a boom market (James).
As consulting practices grew, so too did the percent of revenues generated. Consulting fees were
soaring, but growth within audit engagements had leveled off. The SEC noticed the trend, but
the consulting fees were minor in relation to audit revenues. Consulting fees rose to 20% of
audit fees, then 25%, and then 30%. After a string of audit failures, the SEC reexamined the
relationship between audit and consulting engagements. This time the SEC concluded that these
relationships impaired the auditor's objectivity and independence.
These revenues were substantial and the accounting profession was not about to let the SEC
abolish management advisory services. The profession rallied together in opposition of the
SEC's changes. Led by the Big Five accounting firms and the AICPA, the profession
represented a formidable force.
2The argument escalated to the point where the battle became front-page headlines. Former SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt was often quoted accusing accountants of violating independence issues.
These comments were met with a response from former AICPA Chairman Bob Elliot or a Big
Five CEO. As the debate grew more intense and became more public, the press dubbed the fight
the Accounting (or Independence) Wars. The war turned into mudslinging and both sides
seemed to lose perspective over what was at stake.
SEC Viewpoint
The cause of Levitt's crusade was a string of audit failures over a seven year period which cost
investors over $88 billion. Levitt and members of the SEC attributed these failures to conflicts
of interest over audit and consulting work. Consulting fees represented 51% of Big Five
revenues and had grown three times faster than basic audit services (McNamee 157). Levitt
believed that this growth had corrupted the accounting profession.
The SEC's point of contention was that the fees of consulting engagements were so substantial
that the auditor's judgement would be impaired. The auditor would be unwilling to confront
management over audit deficiencies in fear of losing the client. A host of related accusations
followed. For example, the auditor would lose money on the audit engagement, to allow for the
consulting services to get their "foot in the door". Consulting would generate enough revenues
to compensate for the losses.
Accountants argued that there was no relationship between audit failures and consulting fees.
The SEC insisted that regardless of whether an audit failure resulted from consulting
relationships, the appearance of independence was impaired. The reliability of the audited
financial statements depends upon the perception of independence and objectivity. If the
investing public does not feel the auditor is independent of management, the system fails.
Studies were done to determine public perceptions of the audit-consulting relationship. "Users
perceive the benefits of these positive synergies [auditing and consulting] to exceed negative
effects on independence as long as the consulting fees are not material to an individual office.
.. .Some evidence suggests that users believe large amounts of consulting services impair auditor
independence" (Maines). Levitt argued that many of these audit-consulting relationships had
substantial fees that were extremely material.
"We'll do 57 percent growth year over year in the consulting business unit," says Rick Romar,
CFO of KPMG's consulting practice. "And we're now at about 40 percent of the firm's entire
revenue." Figures like these emphasize the importance of the consulting business to the
accounting firms. The SEC continued its argument by alleging that the Big Five was dependent
upon these revenues and auditing had taken a back seat to other services. In some firms,
3consulting represented over half of the total revenues, whereas audits accounted for 30%
(Hughes). Put another way, the accounting firms no longer appeared to be an objective third
party.
Accountants Viewpoint
The reason Levitt sought to eliminate consulting work was the same reason the Big Five insisted
on keeping it. Consulting revenues were so substantial that the profession would fight until the
last breath to ensure its survival. Accountants argued that eliminating these services would not
only reduce revenues, but also inhibit the growth of the industry.
Three of the Big Five firms teamed up with the AICPA to combat the SEC demand for changes
within the profession. The remaining two of the Big Five --Pricewaterhousecoopers and Ernst
& Young -- sold their consulting arms. Although their actions supported the SEC proposal to
eliminate consulting, they had an alternative motive. The idea was that contracting the current
consulting divisions would curb the SEC's desire to eliminate all consulting services, and allow
the firms to rebuild those practices. It was also supposed to have the effect of easing SEC
concerns over the growth of these services.
Accountants believed that not only was the elimination of consulting services unfair, but that the
profession had become the SEe's scapegoat. "... (The SEC) is using a sledgehammer when it
ought to use a scalpel" (McNamee). Accountants pointed to the shifting positions the SEC took
over consulting issues. The focus changed from all consulting services, to specific aspects like
IT or actuarial services.
Key figures like former AICPA Chairman Bob Elliot adamantly denied the SEC allegations of
consulting fees impairing the auditors' objectivity. According to Elliot, "the SEC cannot point to
one case where an auditor's independence has been compromised by consulting work, which has
led to fraud." Despite all the speeches, studies, and committees, the SEC could not prove
consulting had compromised an audit. This fact, more than any other, swayed enough public
opinion to save certain aspects of consulting.
4Elements of the 4ccountinl! Wars
The SEC-proposed changes brought a firestorm of accusations and criticism from the accounting
profession. These are the elements that fueled the debate.
Principles of Independence
One way the SEC decided to address independence conflicts was to redefine the principles.
Although these changes had implications to the ongoing accounting debate, many of the
principles had become outdated. The SEC designed the principles to address independence
issues, as well as, mitigate future problems.
"The four governing principles state that independence is impaired when an auditor: (1) has a
mutual or conflicting interest with the audit client; (2) audits the auditor's own work; (3)
functions as management or an employee of the audit client; or (4) acts as an advocate for the
audit client" (Maines).
The debate over 'independence in-fact' versus 'independence in-appearance' dealt directly with
these issues. Auditors insisted that consulting activities never brought about violations of these
principles. The SEC asserted that there was an appearance that the rules were not followed.
Each of these four principles became an element of the Accounting Wars, but the second and
third principles were the core of the debate.
"The Proposed Rule sets forth a general standard for the test of auditor independence,
specifically that the SEC 'will not recognize as independent an accountant who, with respect to
an audit client, is not, or would not be perceived by reasonable investors to be, capable of
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the auditor's
engagement'" (www.sec.gov).
The SEC's proposed rule attempts to end the debate whether or not the auditors are independent
based solely on their actions. The rule indicates that if the perception of independence has been
obscured, the auditor cannot be considered independent.
Financial Relationships with Audit Clients
The SEC expressed concern over auditor independence for those firms in which the audit team
had a financial stake in the client it was auditing. However, unlike many of the other proposed
changes, the Committee expands this practice. Audit firm personnel that are not involved with a
particular engagement, are permitted to have various investments. The types of investments
include loans, checking and savings accounts, and insurance products.
5All staff or management with the ability to influence the audit cannot have any direct or material
indirect financial interest in that client or subsidiary. This limits the investment opportunities for
auditors, especially for partners with numerous SEC clients. In 1999, PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC) admitted to widespread independence violations stemming from financial relationships.
"Almost half of the reported violations involved direct investments by the professional in
securities, mutual funds, bank accounts, or insurance products associated with a client" (CPA
Journal).
The 8,000 independence violations became a media spectacle and diminished the firm's
reputation. The PwC disaster demonstrated the effects of noncompliance with SEC
independence rules. As a result, firms actively eliminated these conflicts.
Emplovment Relationship Conflicts
Like investment conflicts, family relationships with employees of the auditee can affect
independence and integrity. An auditor reviewing the work of immediate family members may
not be as diligent as they would be to an unrelated party. Whether or not the auditor's
performance is exemplary, the appearance is that the auditor's judgement has been impaired.
The SEC imposed new rules to combat these issues.
These new rules ban relationships! with family members who have significant influence on the
audit. While the standard does not specify the extent to which the influence becomes significant,
the rule generally applies to management or highly sensitive positions. Examples of sensitive
positions would include internal auditors, purchasing agents, cashiers, etc.
Non-Audit Services for Audit Clients
Disclosure of Non-Audit Fees
The SEC believed so strongly that non-audit activities impaired independence that firms
providing audit and non-audit services should be forced to disclose non-audit fees. The idea was
that as non-audit fees increase, independence decreases. Having this information would allow
the SEC to determine the extent of the non-audit work.
The SEC wanted disclosure to examine both types of fees and determine the rate at which non-
audit fees were increasing in relation to audit fees. The percentage of non-audit fees to audit and
1 The SEC refers to relationships as any immediate family member, such as spouse, dependents, and others.
'Others' refers to non-dependent close relatives who have a material interest, significant influence, or position
involving sensitive activities.
6total fees could indicate which relationships present the greatest independence risks.
Additionally, the SEC could determine the relationship between audit and consulting in
subsequent audit failures. This information would be useful in addressing unexamined
independence concerns.
Implementing this proposal would require companies to disclose non-audit fees paid to their
auditors. The SEC advocated that the board of directors and the audit committee detail the
controls that ensure audit quality. These controls needed to include measures to segregate audit
and consulting activities. The profession felt that the audit committee should be the determinant
as to auditor independence, and not the SEe.
Information Technology Consulting
Perhaps the most hotly debated of the proposals was the elimination of information technology
consulting. This can be attributed to the characteristics of IT services. First, IT consulting was
one of the most lucrative consulting engagements. Second, IT directly impacted audited systems
by designing systems controls. Finally, IT consultants were responsible for training the
company's employees and acted as management until employees had sufficient skills to maintain
the systems.
Today's economy requires companies to immerse themselves in electronic data interchange
(EDI), management information systems, and Internet sites. Accountants insisted that it would
be impossible to adequately conduct an audit without experienced computer professionals
(McNamee 158). The best way to obtain an understanding of an information system was to work
on it. The Big Five asserted that IT employees were auditing tools, as much as they were
consultants.
The SEC was not about to waiver on this issue. First, the SEC pointed to the principle
prohibiting auditors from reviewing their own work. Auditors trace documents and information
through the systems created by the firm's IT employees. The SEC once again utilized the
"appearance" argument. With engagements as large and costly as IT projects, it appeared that
the audit firm was functioning as management. IT engagements could last several years and,
during this time, the consultants would be responsible for running the company's systems.
Internal Audit Outsourcing
"The practice of outsourcing the internal audit function to the external audit firm has raised fears
by many parties, such as the SEC, of possible independence impairment. The fear stems from
the increased economic bond that exists when additional services are provided to an audit client,
7as well as, the long-held view that internal auditing is a management function and, as such, is
incompatible with the external audit function"(Swanger, et al.).
Internal audit outsourcing was of concern for the SEC during the Accounting Wars. IA
outsourcing mirrors the independence conflicts of Information Technology Consulting. Auditors
rely on the work of the internal audit department. Should internal audit be outsourced, the
external auditor would be reviewing its own work.
Like IT consulting, internal auditing services violate much of the auditor's independence criteria.
The internal audit department acts as an agent for management by examining risks and internal
controls of the business. While internal auditors strive to be objective, they are employed by
management to complete audits and special projects. At the end of their work, internal auditors
make recommendations designed to add value to that business.
Internal audit departments are an internal oversight control of the company. By outsourcing this
function, no separation exists between the internal and external auditor. The unification of these
services eliminates the company's ability to assess risk and internal controls and places these
tasks entirely with the audit firm.
Accountants countered SEC arguments with their standard rhetoric -- no audit failure ever
resulted from a relationship with consulting. The profession utilized another approach by saying
that performing internal audit work would give the external auditors a more in-depth view of the
company. This would result in more effective and efficient audits through better allocation of
time and resources.
Legal Services
Acting as both auditor and advocate has never been an accepted practice in the US. Many
European countries allow multidisciplinary practices (MDPs), and the Big Five has pushed for
the US to sanction these practices. With SEC concerns over independence and strong opposition
from the American Bar Association (ABA), MDPs never stood a chance.
The Big Five has a great deal to gain had those laws been enacted. It was said that Arthur
Andersen was the largest law firm in the United States. Accountants argued that direct access to
the sensitive data they were privy to, put them in the best position to address legal issues.
Advocates made sure to include that barring MDPs constrained the profession to solely auditing.
The SEC and ABA had a relatively easy time of refuting legal service advocates. First, acting as
an advocate of a client eliminates independence. The client would pay the audit firm for
8enhancing its legal position and acting in the best interests of the client. This does not meet the
objectivity criteria.
The other contention is that auditors have no confidentiality relationships with the clients.
Auditors do not have the freedom to divulge information at will; yet, there are situations where
disclosure is required. In these instances, a conflict of interest is created. On one hand the
auditor must disclose information, and on the other, the lawyer is prohibited from doing so.
Other Management Advisory Functions
The SEC had trouble convincing the profession, Congress, and the American public that
eliminating certain management advisory services was essential. Simply defining consulting
proved difficult enough. While debate continued over which services were considered
consulting activities, the SEC was positive which services impaired independence -- IT, internal
audit, and legal.
The public questioned why one consulting activity was targeted, while others were not.
Realizing the flaw within the argument, the SEC took several steps to address these other
consulting services. More conservative SEC proponents encouraged complete elimination of all
audit-consulting relationships. The SEC took the approach that contraction of the consulting
services (mentioned above) presented the greatest opportunity to eliminate independen~e
impairments.
SEC concerned itself with the issues of financial and relationship conflicts and consulting issues.
Special project consulting and various other financial services never reached the forefront of the
debate, thus never became an issue.
Creation of the Independent Standards Board (lSB)
The Public Oversight Board was created in the late 1970s, when Congress held hearings on a
number of audit failures that had shaken confidence in the major auditing firms. The primary
responsibility of the POB was to investigate alleged audit failures and oversee peer reviews.2
While the POB addressed many of the concerns of the time, it was crippled by severe limitations.
First, the Board had no enforcement power. The Board was seen only as an intermediary to the
SEC and not a force that could directly impact the profession. Next, the Board received a great
2Peer reviews are a triennial review process in which the major accounting firms examine one another's quality
control procedures.
9deal of its funding from the Big Eight (now Big Five). 3 As these firms contributed substantial
amounts, many wondered who was controlling the POB.
With mounting independence concerns over the POB, the SEC was forced to search for
alternative oversight processes. New ideas about regulatory committees were examined, such as
government or outside funding and changes to membership criteria. Although these concerns
existed, the government remained confident in the profession's ability to regulate itself and
decided to defer POB issues to another time.
Results of Accounting Wars
The Accounting Wars were a draw. The press reported that the accounting profession had
weathered the storm and saved many consulting activities. Pressures from accountants,
lobbyists, and government officials, as well as, changing political tides forced the SEC to
withdraw some of its demands. From the SEC's point of view, it accomplished most of what it
set out to do and let the profession and public know independence violations would not be
tolerated.
The SEC eliminated the family relation conflicts of interest and was surprisingly liberal on
changes to financial relationships. The commission required disclosure of non-audit fees and
dismissed any future for multidisciplinary practices in the United States. Although these issues
are substantial, they were not the Big Five's greatest concern.
The biggest blow came from the SEC's demands for the elimination of IT consulting to audit
clients. Deloitte & Touche has recently initiated similar actions of PwC and E&Y by eliminating
its consulting practice. KPMG took its consulting division public. Although unrelated to the
SEC demands, Andersen was already in the process of losing its consulting services.4 However,
Andersen felt the impact of the ban, as it had promised to rebuild its consulting practice.








3Consolidation within the accounting profession has decreased the number of large firms to five, known as the Big
Five.
4The Andersen Worldwide consulting group was known as Andersen Consulting, which was renamed to Accenture.
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Somehow several other outsourcing functions and consulting activities were reprieved.
Although the similarities between IT consulting and internal audit outsourcing were apparent, the
SEC elected to retain internal audit outsourcing on a restricted basis. "Under the final rule, an
auditor's independence is impaired by perfonning more than forty percent of the audit client's
internal audit work related to the internal accounting controls, financial systems, or financial
statements..." (www.sec.gov).
"Accounting firms must demonstrate to the profession's overseers that their supervision and pay
systems don't give auditors incentives to cut comers to win consulting jobs and that they
discipline auditors who stray" (McNamee). This was the common view of how the profession
could right the ship, but only a year later Enron collapsed. Enron's downfall redistributed the
power, and every change debated during the Accounting Wars will have a new sounding board.
Chan1!es from Enron
It has been said that Enron' s downfall was unthinkable. The reality is that the misdeeds of one
firm stunned the strongest financial economy in the world. Enron cost investors over $80 billion
and employees thousands of jobs. The government is frantically defusing an already exploded
bomb in hopes that this never occurs again. What is certain, is that Andersen's audit failure will
bring about more proposals and changes to the profession than the all past accounting conflicts.
While only little more than a year has passed since the height of the 'Accounting Wars' , the
environment in both the SEC and the accounting profession has changed. The SEC has a new
chairman, Harvey Pitt, and new demands in overseeing accountants. But even the SEC has taken
a backseat to the politicians. For the mean time, Congress is the real oversight committee.
The SEC has taken some criticism for its regulatory processes and its alleged compromise of the
Accounting Wars. It is not alone. The POB, FASB, and AICPA have received their share of
criticism as well. Government officials have begun proposing changes that address the
inefficiencies, poor oversight, and lack of independence of the current regulatory process.
The government's goal is to rebuild investor perceptions of the US economy and of the
accounting profession. Like Levitt, the government is focusing much of its attention on non-
audit services and the independence of auditors. However, this is not the Accounting Wars
revisited. Accountants' objections will not headline the Wall Street Journal. Public opinion and
political influence will not affect the government's decisions.
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Financial Reporting Alterations
A great deal of attention has been placed on the complexity and nature of financial reporting.
Both the government and press have stated their desire for simplification of financial
information. The methods of simplification have been vague, but suggestions ranging from
increasing the speed of new standards to pro forma financial statements have been presented.
The recent trend has been citing the need for cooperation among financial and accounting
servIces.
Changes to Accounting Standards
"The reforms under consideration include: a system of 'current' disclosure, more disclosures of
'trend' and 'evaluative' data, an updated and improved system of periodic disclosure, clearer and
more understandable financial statements, disclosures about critical accounting policies, faster
and more responsive setting of accounting standards, a more rigorous system of oversight of the
accounting profession, a system safer from conflicts of interest among auditors, more meaningful
protection by audit committees, and a system of more transparent analyst recommendations"
(Schlank).
The profession has been charged with creating accounting standards that are too obscure and
complex for the average investor. Congress has raised the issue as to whether the complexity of
these standards is beneficial to the public. In order for the public to better understand the
information, government officials have addressed two changes --(1) the creation of a new
governance board to supervise the profession (discussed below), and (2) the adoption of less
complex standards.
It has been said in the past that accountants are the only people who can understand the issues
involved in financial reporting. The Enron scandal has only further broadened this issue. Public
outcry has suggested financial statements cannot be easily deciphered, and investors cannot base
decisions on certain information. "More information and timely disclosures in plain English are
required" (Castellano).
The problem is that many business issues are too unique and intricate to fit nicely into one easy-
to-understand set of rules. Accountants argue that complex issues necessitate complex rules.
One response has been requiring further disclosures within the notes of the statements. Financial
information that is unclear would require further elaboration as to allow the average investor to
base decisions on it.
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Pro Forma Financial Statements
The Enron disaster brought about the search for alternate means of financial reporting, and as a
result, the SEC has cautioned that pro forma financial statements loom on the horizon. Pro
forma financial information is a controversial topic within the profession. Accountants argue
that this alternative reporting method presents a host of new dilemmas. Pro forma information
does not coincide with GAAP. Without a set of standards, pro forma reporting is unstructured
and easily manipulated.
Pro forma figures differ from GAAP by excluding certain expenses and losses from earnings.
Although unprofitable companies are strong supporters of pro forma reporting, statistics have
shown that pro forma differs greatly from GAAP reporting. For example, in the fourth quarter of
2001, Amazon reported a pro forma loss of $58 million. When measured with GAAP, Amazon's
net loss nearly tripled to $170 million.
Even the SEC agrees that pro forma information can create problems. The SEC said the method
"may not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being." Pro forma
eliminates one-time events, tax effects, and other information that would be included within
GAAP reports. Nevertheless, the SEC believes that accurate pro forma reports offer insights into
businesses that GAAP reporting cannot.
Prospective Financial Information
Pressure from the investing public and government officials for forward-looking financial
information has caused regulators to search for alternative measures of business performance.
Prospective information would address the concern of more timely information. This forward-
looking information would allow for more up-to-date information than the current historical
reporting model. With the assistance of the Internet, prospective reports could be accessed at
anytime from anywhere. Advocates believe that this information will mitigate the risk of
convoluted financial information, such as Enron's special purpose entity issues.
Even the most accurate forecasts will be wrong despite the best intentions of management.
Unpredictable occurrences like economic downturns or natural disasters cannot be incorporated
into this information. "It all comes down to demand. The limitations of any system are always
going to be tied to the fact that you're waiting on inputs from somebody or something" (Meyers
44). Reliance on these forecasts could cause financial catastrophes. Finally, should another
Enron-type disaster occur, there would be even less opportunity to assess the degree of the
parties at fault.
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The inclusion of non-financial information in prospective financial statements could be another
pitfall. For years, the issue of including non-financial information has been suggested, but it is
apparent that this is the time for its implementation. Several benefits can be derived from the use
of this information, such as technical know-how, unique training characteristics, or brand name
valuation.
Government officials are calling for auditors and analysts to work together in compiling this
information. This cooperation should enhance the reliability of the prospective information.
Furthermore, the relationship provides the auditors with another point of view. The analysts may
offer new risks, overlooked issues, or sensitive information that may be of use during the audit.
Elimination of Non-Audit Services
Internal Audit Outsourcing
While internal audit outsourcing was raised and debated during the Accounting Wars, the SEC
decided that restricting the service to 40% was sufficient to mitigate independence violations.
After Enron, pundits like television correspondent Lou Dobbs, saw the decision to allow internal
audit outsourcing to continue as an SEC failure.
Steps have already been taken to eliminate this conflict. The Big Five firms decided to take a
pro-active approach and eliminate these services for all external audit clients. The hope is that
pro-active steps will lessen the government's desire for drastic changes. Meanwhile, the
profession is waiting for the SEC to permanently eliminate internal audit outsourcing from
external audit clients.
During the Accounting Wars, the Big Five and AICPA officials pointed to the fact that the SEC
did not have proof that consulting fees ever resulted in an audit failure. As the internal and
external auditor, Andersen potentially gave definitive proof to the SEC. The fees resulting from
management advisory services were in excess of $27 million, while audit fees only resulted in
$25 million.
Enron has breathed new life into internal audit departments. An often-overlooked aspect of
businesses, much more attention is being focused on internal audit. Internal auditors are being
asked to evaluate those controls that deal specifically with financial reporting, and recommend
corrections of any inadequacies.
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Other Non-Audit Services
Like internal audit outsourcing, areas that slipped by during the Accounting Wars, will be
banned in the near future. Some of these services include human resource outsourcing, corporate
finance, and special projects. Whereas accountants were able to mount a substantial defense to
the proposed changes during the Accounting Wars, the profession has little option but to agree
with any and all new proposals.
The future elimination of consulting services has led firms to split off many consulting areas.
During the Wars, the Big Five sold off their IT consulting divisions, but Enron has forced firms
to take more drastic measures. The recent trend has been to eliminate a wide range of services
and institute independence risk assessment committees within the firms.
About the only other service accountants can offer is tax consulting. There are even questions
concerning the independence of this core service. Tax consultants advocate strategies minimizing
taxes. This planning could create independence conflicts. Financial reporting requires the
auditor to examine tax issues. Once again the firm is potentially auditing its work. Another
conflict is earnings management. Tax consultants advocate reducing earnings or increasing
expenses in order to minimize taxes. This impacts the fairness and reliability of reporting.
Government officials have not indicated that this service would be eliminated.
Changes to Governing Bodies
Independent Accountability/Oversight Board
An independent regulatory board should ensure that the accounting profession is held to
the highest ethical standards. Under this proposal, an independent regulatory board
would be established, under the supervision of the SEC, to develop standards of
professional conduct and competence. This board would have the ability to monitor,
investigate, and where needed, enforce its ethics principles by punishing individual
offenders.
-President Bush
This March marked the end of the Public Oversight Board's tenure. The five-member board
voted unanimously to "terminate its existence" (Williams 19). The termination of the POB was
in response to SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt's proposal for a new regulatory body. Citing this
proposal, the POB believed it had no place in the future of accounting.
Pitt's proposal stated his desire for the creation of two new oversight boards. One would act as a
disciplinary board that dealt with audit failures. Its primary purpose would be to examine any
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alleged audit failures. The other board would be responsible for monitoring audit quality. This
board would be responsible for reviews and referrals to the disciplinary board.
The proposed boards differ from past and current regulatory boards in two distinct ways. First,
the proposed boards are to be entirely independent - from its members to funding. The existing
regulatory boards often include members from practice with a background within public
accounting. The funding of these boards is also suspect. The Big Five firms contribute
significant portions to these boards. The other difference is the disciplinary enforcement
previous boards lacked. Other boards could not directly punish, and therefore, do not have the
authority of government agencies.
Increased Review Procedures
Peer reviews were designed to act as a system of checks on auditors. The Big Five firms were
the only accounting firms large and experienced enough to review one another. These firms
would periodically rotate the peer review process. The string of high profile audit failures had
caused SEC officials to search for alternate review processes, but Enron has necessitated that one
is found immediately.
With new boards come new review procedures. Should Pitt successfully enact his proposal for a
new oversight board, peer reviews will become a thing of the past. The new boards will
eliminate the peer review process by creating new review procedures. A function of one of these
boards will be to conduct audit reviews. Compared to past oversight boards, the new board will
be much larger. In order to review Big Five firms, the board would need a talented audit staff
and disciplinary and governing members.
These new review procedures will provide the system of checks and balances the public is
seeking. Although this may not appear to be a major departure from peer review, having an
independent body perform the review eliminates several independence conflicts. First,
accusations of cooperation or collusion cannot be made. Second, reviewers can directly
discipline auditors for deficient findings. Finally, these reviews would also enhance the board's
image as an overseer.
The new review process does raise some new problems. Where will this new army of auditor
regulators come from? What credentials will they have? With so much variation within
accounting, these overseers may not have the adequate skillset to determine the accuracy of the
reporting. For SEC registrant companies, the most experienced auditors would already be
employed by one of the Big Five firms. It does not seem feasible to suggest that the government
would be willing to match the salary of these firms in order to lure away the best people. This
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begs the question, "How will the new review process be more effective than peer review without
the best people?"
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
"Part of the problem is that the SEC has in the past allowed the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) to fail to set timely accounting standards. The FASB must act more quickly in
the future."
- SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt
Like so many other accounting issues, the FASB's future has come under scrutiny. Issues
concerning funding, governance, and effectiveness have been raised. The resulting speculation
has ranged from incremental changes to a complete elimination and federalization of the
standard setting. At a minimum, the new regulatory bodies will carefully scrutinize the
development of new standards.
The FASB in fighting to stay alive. It has taken proactive steps in altering its standard-setting
process. The board's biggest criticism has been the inefficiency in developing of new standards.
FASB has begun proposing changes in an attempt to convince government officials and the
American public that the standard-setting process will be efficient. These proposed changes
include the following: (1) changing the voting requirement for approval from a supermajority to
a simple majority and (2) shorter comment periods for proposed standards
FASB has another significant speed bump to overcome. Independence concerns have been
raised about the funding and relationships of the Board. Fears of Big Five dominating FASB
have led many to speculate that the Board is not independent. First, the current seven-member
board is composed of three public practice members - usually Big Five advocates. The second
contention is that significant contributions by Big Five firms represent a substantial portion of
the Board's overall funds. It remains unclear as to how FASB will address the status of members
and funding concerns.
Self-Regulation & Self-Governance
Will the government intervene as a regulatory body? Just a year ago, the question would be
easily answered, "No." But in the wake of Enron, accountants are not so confident. While
complete governmental regulation is unlikely, the profession can expect new oversight and
regulatory boards and changes to the existing agencies. Nonetheless, the AICPA will continue
certifying accountants and disciplining violators and CPAs will remain as the only government
sanctioned auditors.
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Where self-regulation is the monitoring and enforcement of codes of conduct, quality control,
and promulgation of GAAP and GAAS, self-governance refers to the accountants' role in
guiding the profession and determining its future. CPAs can expect the government to dictate the
profession's immediate future. Topics like expansion of consulting services and the need for an
alternati ve credential have taken a back seat to the upcoming changes.
The days of the FASB's inefficient standard setting have passed. So many initiatives have been
undertaken that the role of private sector governance is vanishing. While the SEC always had the
final word, the profession could rally together and present a formidable defense. Enron has
eliminated much of that ability given control to the Congress and the SEC. The new model of
accounting includes increased awareness at the congressional level and tighter controls by SEC
officials. The government will spend much more time and money overseeing accounting issues.
For the meantime, the profession is unable to defend itself or expect any public support. It can
only outlast the storm.
Future of Accountinll
Where does the profession go from here?
The profession's private regulatory process is on the way out. While few proposals have been
ratified, past changes and present actions have predetermined the short-term future of
accounting. New supervisory boards, independence standards, and government involvement will
limit the power of the AICP A's ability to self-regulate. The charge for the SEC to advance its
oversight procedures has also reduced the hope for continued private control.
The media has inundated the public with future accounting changes, but there are three areas that
can expect the most substantial changes --financial reporting, oversight committees, and non-
audit services.
Changes within Financial Reporting
As all of the changes directly or indirectly impact financial reporting, it is the core of accounting
disputes. The issues concerning consulting and independence relate to reliability of financial
reporting. The issues concerning standards and governing bodies address the relevance of the
financial information.
Direct changes to financial reporting are currently the responsibility ofFASB. The FASB and
new oversight committee will be at the forefront of future changes. Each proposed standard will
be measured using a new set of criteria. The new criteria will include clarity, timeliness, and
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necessity. The new oversight committee will be focused on the causes of recent misstatements --
especially Enron. Revenue and debt recognition and special purpose entities will be two of the
issues promptly addressed.
The proposed changes to financial reporting standards are contradictory. Congress and the SEC
demand more timely standards, but the press and investing public seek clarity in financial
reporting. Quickly ratifying additional standards will increase the complexity of financial
reporting, which will lead to further confusion.
FASB, along with the SEC and other regulatory bodies can expect a wide array of problems
stemming from pro forma information. First, pro forma information will be unaudited and could
mislead investors. These misled investors will accuse accountants of providing unreliable
information, which would further degrade the profession's reputation. Reliance on this
information would cause more problems than the present historical reporting model. Pro forma
reports do not address the public concerns over the reliability of financial information.
Despite the setbacks, the government will pursue a new financial reporting model. This model
will be designed to include pro forma information, risks and uncertainties, non-financial data,
and be accessed through a variety of channels (Castellano 39).
Changes to Governing Bodies
New governing bodies will reshape the face of accounting. Boards and committees have come
and gone during the profession's history, but there has never been an accounting issue as
predominant as Enron. The new boards resulting from the Enron scandal will have authority and
responsibilities its predecessors did not. Success or failure will be determined by how well the
new board uses its power.
These new standard-setting and oversight boards are widening the divergence between the self-
regulation and government regulation. This unfortunate result of Enron has a side effect that
further decreases the power of the profession. As more and more of the ability to govern itself is
taken away, the less power the profession had to resist government changes and take active
measures in expanding services.
It is unlikely that the accounting profession will deteriorate to providing only the traditional
services, but should misstatements continue, complete government intervention is foreseeable.
The AICPA has lost much ofthe public's confidence, and therefore, CPAs are not the trusted
professionals they once were. The government will take any steps necessary to rebuild the
public's confidence in financial statements. The bottom line is the profession can expect heavy
government intervention until that confidence is restored.
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Elimination of Non-Audit Services
Consulting was the crux of the Accounting Wars. The once heated debate has fizzled into
voluntary contraction. Arguments over impaired independence, whether in appearance or in fact,
have been settled once and for all.
When it came to light that Andersen preformed the internal and external audit functions, the
future of IA outsourcing was sealed. Human resources and financial service consulting will be
completely done away with. Even certain special project consulting engagements will cease for
audit clients. Any engagement in which management is anything other than a third party is
susceptible to elimination.
The consulting activities that continue will be restricted. Research has shown that a small
percentage of consulting work for audit clients does not affect public perceptions of
independence. Those accepted services would be confined to an established percent of audit
fees.
As mentioned above, speculation over the continuation of one of the longest running accounting
functions, tax work, was considered. The SEC would be hard pressed to convince businesses
and even its own members to ban tax consulting to audit clients.
Conclusion
The accounting profession longs for days of the Accounting Wars. The heated exchanges
between the SEC and the profession would seem comical. The SEe's independence proposals
would be seen as worthwhile changes that will benefit the profession's image. Arthur Levitt
would be revered as the man who solved the independence question with fair and impartial
changes.
Okay, maybe not... but maybe the profession needs to rethink its views on the Accounting Wars.
Perhaps the public argument was advantageous to the profession. Since the profession is in no
position to defend itself, at least the Accounting Wars give the government guidelines in its
attempt to correct the Enron mistakes. Imagine hundreds of lawyers planning the future of
accounting without any criteria to base their decisions.
By following the independence debates, the government is allowing firms to take proactive steps.
Firms have already begun restricting consulting services, and the Big Five is preparing for the
new oversight board(s). The open issues of the Accounting Wars will not be the entirety of the
results from Enron, but it may cushion the blow.
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Four decades of controversy over independence has culminated in the downfall of one company.
Enron will bring about more changes to the accounting profession than all the independence,
oversight, and financial reporting debates put together. Hopefully, under the right leadership,
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